Non-domestic sources of the Canadian boreal forest policy: Integrating theories of internationalisation and pathways of forest policy change

Convening lead authors: Devin Judge-Lord and Irene Scher

Lead author: Benjamin Cashore

Abstract: Environmental groups' interest in, and attention to, Canadian boreal forest protection and management is a relatively new phenomenon vis-à-vis the longstanding focus on Canadian temperate forests. Nevertheless, policy development affecting the Canadian boreal forest has, in the past decade, been punctuated towards a new equilibrium in which both protection and forest management policies have increased dramatically. What explains this punctuation? This chapter aims to shed light on the answer to this question by exploring the role of non-domestic forces in shaping Canadian boreal forest policies. We examine the International Boreal Conservation Campaign (IBCC) initiated by the Philadelphia-based Pew Charitable Trusts and the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement, using Bernstein and Cashore's pathways framework (2002, updated 2012), which identifies four distinct pathways through which non-domestic factors can influence domestic policy change. Through inductive historical-process tracing, we develop two related arguments. First, non-domestic factors do not explain policy change itself, which arguably would have occurred even in the absence of international pressures, but they help explain both the pace and scale of change. In other words, the changes would have likely taken longer and been of lesser scale if not for the influence of non-domestic factors in general and the IBCC in particular. Second, we argue that while much attention has focused on the markets pathway, a significant amount of effort along the direct-access pathway helps account for much of the noted policy changes. As a result, we call for more study of direct access of international groups in domestic policy and interaction among the pathways. We conclude by reviewing the implications of these findings both for theories of internationalisation and policy change as well as implications for environmental and business strategy.

Keywords: Canadian boreal forest, policy change, punctuated equilibrium, pathways, internationalisation.

9.1 Introduction: A puzzling punctuation in Canadian boreal forest policy[1]

The Canadian boreal forest is one of the world's largest areas of old-growth forest, but in the past two decades, new roads and innovations in timber processing have made timber harvesting profitable in large new areas. This has sparked policy debates about the extent to which this newly profitable source of fibre should be commercially harvested, to what extent harvesting practices should be regulated, and whether greater protected areas ought to be established. In part owing to these public concerns, between 2000 and 2008 there was a significant "punc-

[1] Note: This chapter updates and is based upon research originally conducted by Irene Scher through her thesis for Yale University's Environmental Studies Program, where the argument about pace and scale of change was first advanced and developed (Scher 2008).

tuation" (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, Jones et al. 2002) in Canadian boreal forest policy in which protected areas expanded from about 8% to about 30% of Canada's boreal forest while regulations on forest practices also increased (IBCC 2008).

The policy change that has received the most attention is the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement, which has been called "the world's largest conservation agreement" because it covers 72 million ha of boreal forest. The agreement incorporates commitments and governance beyond the state, including forest certification and enhanced protections. Companies agreed to defer harvesting for three years on more than 29 million ha. They also agreed to lobby governments to adopt more protective forest practice guidelines and conservation plans, including protected areas.

What explains this policy punctuation?

This chapter focuses on the role of international forces in shaping the development of policies governing forest protection and forest practices in the Canadian boreal forest during the 1990s and 2000s. We assess how international actors travelled distinct pathways of influence to help shape these domestic forest policies. In so doing, we provide a theoretically grounded explanation of the punctuation. We argue that existing literature on international influences on domestic policy-making and policy punctuations, while useful, cannot completely account for two findings that resulted.

First, while most scholarly attention to international forces has focused on market pressure, such as boycott campaigns, it appears that much of the durable impact of international forces occurred through what Bernstein and Cashore (2012) refer to as the "direct access to the domestic policy-making process" pathway – which represents, as we discuss below, a very different causal logic than that assumed by most of the literature.

This argument confronts popular accounts that primarily focus on market pressures resulting from NGO (non-governmental organisation) campaigns. In the early 2000s, several international environmental NGOs (ENGOs) ran aggressive boycott campaigns against companies selling products from the Canadian boreal forest. According to these accounts, the Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (CBFA) came about because the Canadian forest products industry was pressured to make concessions in order for Greenpeace, Canopy, and ForestEthics to suspend their boycott campaigns as part of the agreement.

Upon careful analysis, market pressure alone appears to be insufficient to explain the scale of the CBFA, which also appears to have been influenced by an even longer-running campaign by the US-based Pew Charitable Trusts, which focused on domestic political processes. In fact, significant policy change in local and national policy venues preceded the market campaigns and the signing of the CBFA. Under this direct-access account, the cumulative effect of domestic and international forces over time helps explain the unprecedented scale of CBFA.

Second, international forces appear not to have played a significant role in triggering domestic responses, which had already begun to be developed before the campaign and which would have likely influenced the policy choices that followed. However, it does appear that non-domestic forces contributed to the pace and scale of policy change (Scher 2008). That is, international pressures appear to have increased the scope, and ultimate equilibrium, of the policy punctuation. This case underscores the importance of studying interactions among transnational policy advocacy efforts and further developing theories of how international actors gain direct access to domestic policy-making. Taken together, our arguments call for better integrating and expanding insights from the two relatively distinct literatures on international relations and public policy.

To illustrate the plausibility of these arguments, we focus on assessing the role of the International Boreal Conservation Campaign (IBCC) in influencing domestic policy choices. Following this introduction, we examine the case of the CBFA (the dependent variable). This section provides an overview of the policy changes, focusing on both forest preservation (areas with no logging) and forest practices (how and where to log). Next, we review the creation of the IBCC (the independent variable). Section 9.4 presents Bernstein and Cashore's analytical framework that identifies four distinct pathways and allows for a robust assessment of these international influences. Section 9.5 presents the results of our analysis, revealing how the market and direct-access pathways were most travelled. We argue that these efforts shifted the degree, but not the direction, of policy change. Section 9.6 explores the implications of these findings for theories of internationalisation and policy change as well as implications for environmental and business strategy. We conclude by assessing the implications of our findings for the next generation of research on understanding forces that shape policy-making in the global era.

9.2 The dependent variable

Accounting for a quarter of the world's remaining forest area, the boreal forest is of great interest to both environmental groups and forest products companies. A few hundred kilometres above the US-



Figure II 9.1 Areas of suspended timber harvest in Boreal Caribou Range.
©Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (www.canadianborealforestagreement.com)

Canadian border, the boreal forest dominates 10 000 continuous kilometres from Alaska to the Atlantic Ocean. At 600 million ha (1.4 billion acres), the boreal ecosystem covers more than half of Canada (Wilson 2003), plays a significant role in both ameliorating and contributing to the world's carbon emissions (Jardine 1994, Moen et al. 2014), and is the last of North America's frontier Forests (Figure II 9.1). Frontier forests are forest ecosystems that are large enough to continue to support viable populations of all indigenous species and can maintain those species even in the event of disaster or disturbance (Bryant et al. 1997). At the same time, with new logging roads and enhanced mill capacity and harvesting technologies, many forest products companies in Canada see the more remote northern reaches of the boreal forest as the next frontier from which to source fibre for domestic and international markets (ForestEthics 2004). Out of this tension emerged a surprising scale of policy agreement on forest practices and protected areas.

The CBFA, signed on May 18, 2010, has been said to be the "largest conservation deal ever" (Hubert 2011). The CBFA called for a three-year suspension of logging on 29 million ha and sustainable management of the remaining 43 million ha outside of these protected areas, as defined by best practices, including those of the Boreal Standard of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (Yale Environment 360 2010). This agreement covered 15% to 20% of the boreal forest (Figure II 9.1). The 29 million ha with a three-year logging suspension represent "virtually all critical woodland caribou habitat in the lands managed by the forest companies that are party to this agreement" (Paterson 2010).

The CFBA is a non-binding voluntary agreement between nine ENGOs and 21 forest products companies. The companies party to the agreement were to suspend logging in certain sensitive areas and engage in forestry according to the FSC Boreal Standard in the remainder. ENGOs agreed to suspend boycott campaigns and cautiously started to praise the industry. News stories about the agreement cited strengthened relationships with customers and reputations for sustainable forest management as major incentives for the Canadian Forest Products Association and its associated members (Braun 2010, Boychuk 2011, Paterson 2010, Hubert 2011).

Of unprecedented scale, the CBFA is still contested by signatory parties. According to an interview with Steven Kallick (in 2007), director of the Pew Environment Group's IBCC, the aim was to make this logging suspension permanent. According to Greenpeace, "The goal is to have science inform

how much of the 72 million ha needs to be protected" (Paterson 2010). In contrast, Avrim Lazar, president and CEO of the Canadian Forest Products Association, emphasised that the land has not been permanently taken out of production (Austen 2010).

Implementation of the agreement has been monitored through annual auditing. The first audit for 2011 found that progress was underway in five of six goals but that milestone completion was lagging: five milestones were completed, 10 were works in progress, one had encountered an obstacle, and four had not yet been started (Gunn 2011). One of the milestones, the creation of Boreal Business Forum, a collaboration of customers and investors, had been launched with the purpose of monitoring progress and providing market recognition to participating companies (Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement Secretariat 2011).

This section has identified the dependent variable as change in both protected area and forestry practices and the relevant policy process as including both high-profile negotiations between environmental and industry groups and local and national conservation planning and policy processes. The next section discusses the independent variable – the international forces that might explain the unprecedented scale of overall change to policies governing Canada's boreal forest.

9.3 The independent variable

In the late 1990s, the Pew Charitable Trusts began to explore possibilities for land conservation in the northern forests of Canada. Scepticism about Canadian forest practices was piqued by new road development and harvesting concessions in the northern boreal ecosystem (Jardine 1994). An analysis of the potential for a Pew campaign in boreal forest suggested that there was an opportunity to secure large tracts of protected area and affect how the remaining forests were managed (Francis 2000). Pew launched its Canadian campaign in 1999 with an initial goal of protecting 100 million acres (~40 million ha) by 2010. However, it was clear that new strategies and tactics would be necessary in order for a US-based campaign to achieve ambitious conservation goals.

Pew launched the IBCC to serve as an umbrella organisation for the domestic and international NGO constituents of the new coalition. Two of these organisations were founded by Pew: the Canadian Boreal Initiative in Ottawa, Ontario, and the Boreal Songbird Initiative (BSI) headquartered in Seattle, Washington. Other environmental coalition partners include Ducks Unlimited Canada, Ducks Unlimited US, World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) Canada, Forest Ethics, Canadian Parks and Wilderness, and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) International Program located in Washington, DC (Scher 2008).

The campaign was built around a conservation plan laid out in the Canadian Boreal Forest Conservation Framework: a statement of the campaign's long-term goals and one of the most ambitious conservation declarations made in the history of land conservation. The campaign's director, Steve Kellick, felt that the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework could be a "compelling vision for the boreal, one that captivates public imagination while satisfying the pragmatic concerns of government and industry."[(2)]

The Boreal Forest Conservation Framework delineates a goal to protect 50% of Canada's boreal ecosystem and have the remaining half under sustainable management. This percentage was chosen in light of a review commissioned by the IBCC of existing quantitative conservation assessments. Six Canadian ecologists were hired to determine the literature range for the percentage of an ecosystem that must be conserved in order to preserve ecosystem function. Though preserving ecosystem function was a loosely defined goal, the review concluded that the median literature range was just above 50% (Schmeigelow et al. 2004). Campaign directors concluded that by advocating 50% strict protection and sustainable practices on the remaining half, the key functions of the Canadian boreal forest could be maintained (CBI 2003)

The IBCC received attention for the swift policy responses that followed its creation (Wilson 2003). This section assesses how the sustained international effort surrounding the IBCC (the independent variable) towards its ambitious goal might have effected the observed policy changes regarding protected areas and forest practices in the Canadian boreal forest. In the following sections, we assess possible pathways that may connect the inception of the IBCC and related international forces to the dramatic upturn in boreal conservation.

9.4 The analytic framework: Four potential pathways of internationalisation

Internationalisation is the process by which transnational actors influence domestic policy. While most scholarship on policy change focuses on the effects of domestic forces, internationalisation scholarship looks to international forces to explain domestic

[(2)] Personal Communication with Steven Kallick, Director of the International Boreal Conservation Campaign, Pew Charitable Trusts, 2007.

policy change. As a case where international actors have attempted to influence domestic policy with different strategies, the recent changes in Canada's boreal forest policy present an opportunity to test the utility of theories of internationalisation. Can theories of internationalisation improve our understanding of when different strategies are effective beyond common narratives? For this case, we selected Bernstein and Cashore's (2012) pathways framework because it squarely addresses the market campaigns that have received much popular attention as well as other strategies that have received less attention. By distinguishing strategies deployed by international groups according to their underlying causal logics, this framework purports to add leverage to questions about which actions by international actors could actually help explain observed policy changes. Additionally, because the framework was designed to integrate preceding constructivist and neorealist theories of internationalisation, multiple theoretical perspectives are represented (Bernstein and Cashore 2012).

9.4.1 Methods

We employ a historical institutionalist approach and the method of process tracing to analyse the influence of actors with respect to Canadian domestic policy changes. Our empirical data was collected through in-person interviews with key actors who participated in and closely observed the processes under investigation as well as hundreds of documents associated with these processes and agreements. Process tracing is a method that involves breaking down complex chains of events into discrete temporal observations that allow logic-based inferences about cause-and-effect relationships. Bennett and George (1997) note that "a process-tracing explanation differs from a historical narrative, as it requires converting a purely historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design." In this case, the pathways framework of internationalisation offers such a research framework that posits different causal sequences, each requiring different conditions to explain change in the domestic policy process.

Process tracing allows assessment of complex questions of public policy distinct from statistical inference regardless of the size and scope of the inquiry, but especially with respect to within-case analysis. Such an approach cannot tease out precise causality, which might be impossible, but this method, combined with our analytical framework, is designed to better understand the causal logics at work over time to explain the scope and scale of the policy change.

9.4.2 Pathways

Bernstein and Cashore (2000) posit four pathways to internationalisation of domestic policy change: the *markets* pathway, the *international rules* pathway, the *international norms and discourse* pathway, and the *direct access to the domestic policy-making process* pathway. Each pathway suggests a set of hypothesis about how transnational actors affect domestic policy. These pathways and the conditions required for each to operate emerge from an integration of previous explanatory theories and have become a useful framework for empirical research (see review in Bernstein and Cashore 2012). The following paragraphs highlight relevant aspects of the pathways framework.

Market Dependence: Transnational actors use the power of international markets directly to pressure companies, industries, or governments by threatening exporting companies with decreased market share (e.g. through boycott campaigns) if they do not comply with the campaign's demands (e.g. product certification). In such cases, Bernstein and Cashore suggest that policy change depends less on domestic politics than on the dependence of the target country on susceptible foreign markets. This pathway is particularly relevant to the widespread adoption of sustainable forest management certification standards (e.g. FSC and the Canadian Standards Association) and other strategies directly targeting company behaviour (Bernstein and Cashore 2012).

International Rules: In this pathway, transnational actors use international policy-making processes such as treaties or trade agreements to force domestic changes in other countries. Legitimacy of the international rule-making body, enforceability of the agreement, and fear of losing international credibility and investor confidence can compel countries to change domestic policies in accordance with international laws (Bernstein and Cashore 2012).

International Normative Discourse: This pathway operates when transnational actors encourage states to follow certain norms by creating information, symbolism, and accountability. A norm in this sense is a cultural axiom. When transnational actors aid in the formation and adoption of a norm, durable domestic policy responses are observed. Bernstein and Cashore suggest that the success of transnational actors along this pathway depends on the moral vulnerability of the target state, the resonance of the norm with domestic ideology, and the ability of the transnational actors to engage other states and actors in placing the norm on the global agenda (Bernstein and Cashore 2012).

Access to the Domestic Policy-Making Process: Transnational actors utilise this pathway by participating directly or indirectly in domestic policy processes. Often this includes the transfer of informa-



Figure II 9.2 Tracing pathways of international influence in Canadian boreal forest policy.

tion and/or resources from the transnational actors to groups or influential bodies within the target state. Bernstein and Cashore (2012) suggest that for this pathway to be effective, the existing organisations and networks that influence policy within the country must be open to working with external actors. Additionally, change is more likely when the target state's government is autonomous from business interests and when the state has the capacity to institute the proposed policy changes.

The framework draws on an analytic distinction made between the intersecting forces of internationalisation and globalisation. Internationalisation, defined as increasing external forces on domestic policy, is distinct from globalisation, which is defined as the increasing liberalisation of global trade. However, for the market-dependence pathway, international trade – to the extent that it creates dependence on foreign markets – is a necessary precondition. Globalisation is not required for the other three pathways but is often present and can influence the success of the pathway as a mechanism for domestic change (Bernstein and Cashore 2012).

To assess which pathways were active, we trace possible causal influences of different strategies employed by transnational actors in the boreal campaign. Through process tracing and systematic attention to counterfactual scenarios, we assess potential moments of influence by transnational actors in Canadian domestic policy-making. Figure II 9.2 presents a radically simplified illustration of how this method assesses causal connections and parses out hypothesised mechanisms by assessing hypotheses about expected values of key variables before, during, and after critical junctures (shown by black vertical lines). The observed context of each critical event was then matched with potential pathways (not shown) to provide an analytical account of the boreal case. In the larger analysis, Pew and other actors do not follow only one pathway at a time but often employ a mixture of interacting strategies with distinct causal logics. Applying the Bernstein and Cashore framework allows some assessment of which strategies were effective. Assessment of these processes and counterfactual analysis suggests that, enabled by funds, information, and legal assistance from Pew, First Nations and Canadian ENGOs achieved conservation commitments at a pace and scale that would not have been realised otherwise, primarily through patterns that best fit the direct-access logic.

The next section elaborates on this finding, describing the history of the IBCC and related campaigns with respect to each of each of the four pathways. While the Bernstein and Cashore framework delineates convincing mechanisms whereby policies can change in response to new transnational pressures, it does not immediately offer insights about the nature of the change itself. For this, we turn to the public policy literature, which stresses the importance of distinguishing between the directionality of change from its pace and scale (Cashore and Howlett 2007). Thus, in the following analysis, we parse out both the mechanisms of change and whether these help explain the directionality or the pace and scale of change.

9.5 How and when do international initiatives affect domestic forest policy?

Previous analyses have attributed Bernstein and Cashore's market pathway as the most important mechanism for transnational influence. However, evidence from the Canadian boreal case suggests that direct access to the domestic policy-making process may be more important than previously thought (Scher 2008). This section compares evidence to the necessary conditions that Bernstein and Cashore identify as required for each distinct causal logic to operate in order to assess which pathway(s) might have been travelled effectively at different times.

The markets pathway was certainty travelled with vigour, but the broader context weakens this pathway as a potential source of significant policy change. Market campaigns targeted companies such as Limited Brands and Kleenex for sourcing fibre from virgin boreal stands, placing pressure on their upstream pulp suppliers. ENGOs also negotiated with timber companies directly to encourage the adoption of FSC standards. Many of these corporations also became signatories of the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework and/or participated as constituents of the Boreal Leadership Council as means of brand management, as the logic of the markets pathway predicts.

By targeting retailers, ENGO market campaigns prevented the Canadian timber industry from entering niche green markets. ENGOs then bolstered these same companies' green brands after the CBFA was signed. The industry also sought out different revenue streams through production and innovation in bioenergy, bioplastics, and a zero-waste policy (CNTG 2009, Browne et al. 2010, Palma et al. 2010, Boychuk 2011). As Lazar stated, "Canadian timber companies needed to "extract more value from every tree. And we've got to be not just ahead of the curve on the environment – we've got to translate being ahead of the curve into some sort of market advantage" (Boychuk 2011). Today the Canadian Forest Products Association is actively advertising its sustainability standards and has created a substantial website about industry efforts on topics including climate change, responsible sourcing, forest certification, illegal logging, sustainable forest management, and green building (FPAC 2012).

However, Bernstein and Cashore (2000) also suggest that the success of influencing policy through the markets pathway is predicated on the company's or country's vulnerability to market losses from decreased foreign consumer or investor confidence. At first glance, Canada appears vulnerable to such pressure. The Canadian forest products industry is indeed export-driven. By using media to instil fear in US investors and consumers about Canadian forest products, ENGOs hoped to put pressure directly on firms, and indirectly on governments. The common narrative casts the CBFA as a truce forced by market pressure from environmental groups.

Broader shifting market pressures weaken the markets pathway account. Arguably, the commitment of the Canadian Forest Products Association, under the leadership of Avrim Lazar, to the CBFA was partially the culmination of the industry's own efforts to transition into the niche market of sustainably harvested forest products in response to significant market contraction unrelated to the boycott campaigns (Scher 2008). Canadian timber markets are linked to the US housing market (Dyson 2007, Boytano 2010, Boychuk 2011, Preston 2011). With the collapse of the US housing market, Canadian timber sales plummeted from USD 88 billion in 2005 to USD 54 billion in 2010 (Boychuk 2011). Figure II 9.3 shows how US housing starts directly correlate with lumber price and Canadian lumber output. A number of Canadian timber companies entered bankruptcy, and in response the industry sought out different markets (Boychuk 2011, Boytano 2010). With decreasing demand in the United States and increasing exports to other countries, especially China, the necessary condition of market vulnerability is weak.

Though many industry responses directly followed efforts to target Canadian markets and US business partners (such as FSC certification, commitments to stop harvesting of old growth fibre), this correlation, absent the necessary condition of market vulnerability, is insufficient to conclude that the markets pathway independently produced a policy response or has directly led to new conservation. Forest product companies seem to have been primarily pursuing niche sustainability markets and increased business with China rather than responding to boycott campaigns. As described later, if anything, the role of high-profile market campaigns seems to be in raising the profile of direct access strategies.



Figure II 9.3 Price of Lumber and US Housing Starts; Canadian Lumber Output and US Housing Starts (Preston 2011).

Additionally, the dissent of key domestic actors, especially First Nation groups, calls into question the independent policy impact of the CBFA as described by those who emphasised the markets pathway.

Many First Nations groups opposed the agreement because the negotiation process had largely excluded indigenous communities. The Assembly of First Nations rejected the CBFA because "ENGOs and forestry companies negotiated the CBFA without the prior consultation or meaningful participation of First Nations who have jurisdiction over the boreal forest that is located on their ancestral territories" (AFN 2011). The Nishanawbe Aski Nation (NAN) publicly condemned the CBFA for reasons including the failure to uphold the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and because it "violates the aboriginal and treaty rights of NAN" (Garrick 2011, NAN 2012). The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council called on all ENGOs to "improve their policies on working with First Nations communities. At minimum these ENGOs should be adhering to, supporting, and promoting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (The Dominion 2010). First Peoples Worldwide stated, "The Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement is the reigning example of global conservation's disregard for indigenous peoples" (First Peoples Worldwide Blog 2011).

However, the high-profile negotiation between ENGOs and the timber industry was not the only, or perhaps even most significant, venue of policy change. Much of the protected area associated with the CBFA was actually won cumulatively in more established local and national policy processes. In contrast with the CBFA, First Nations have played a much more significant and collaborative role with environmental groups in more open local, national, and international policy processes, travelling the direct-access and, to some extent, the international-rules pathways.

Despite some potentially relevant international rules pathways, international treaties and conventions appear to have had little discernible effect on achieving policy outcomes thus far. The campaign did secure a declaration from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) about the conservation value of the boreal ecosystem and an official recommendation that the boreal ecosystems be protected at its 2004 congress, despite fierce opposition from Canadian IUCN delegates (IUCN 2004, Marilyn Heiman[3]). However, this recommendation is not binding and the Migratory Birds Treaty and the Convention on Biological Diversity do not appear to have been utilised to instigate policy changes. While actors certainty attempted to travel the rules pathway, observed policy outcomes with respect to protected areas and forest practices do not match the rules pathway predictions because none of the observed results were proceeded by or justified by enforcement of an international rule. The presence of germane international rules is insufficient to claim that they are effective in causing domestic policy change.

The FSC and its competitors that have international processes establishing principles and criteria for sustainable forestry were directly relevant to the level of protection achieved. However, as defined by Bernstein and Cashore, the international-rules references agreements enforced by states, while FSC and other forms of private governance are law-like, but not quite law unless officially adopted and enforced by a state. Canada is party to the FSC Principles and Criteria negotiations but does not enforce FSC standards. Thus, the use of FSC's boreal standard in making domestic policy is not an example of the rules pathway but rather a more complex interaction among pathways that does not fit neatly into the four pathways and deserves further investigation.

Through norms pathway, transnational actors may influence domestic policy by integrating normative discourse into their campaigns or by creating and utilising new norms. In Canada, there is a strong norm that ecologically significant areas should be preserved, and notions of conservation and intactness are becoming normative in Canada's environmental discourse (Hoberg 1997, Larry Innes[4], John Pierre Martel[5]). Because ideas about conservation, intactness, and global importance have already taken root in Canadian discourse, a key challenge for the IBCC campaign to travel the norms pathway was to present compelling science that demonstrated the ecological significance of the boreal forest and the ecological imperative to protect at least half of it in large, interconnected areas.

The campaign also worked to frame the boreal forest in light of international conservation norms, for example by referencing charismatic species (Wilson 2003). The public's new recognition and awareness of the boreal forest as a comprehensive ecosystem with high conservation value has been measurable through opinion polling. Interviewees attributed this new norm solely to the campaign and its media strategy that sought specifically to create a brand for the Canadian boreal ecosystem (Anne Levesque[6]).

Policy outcomes achieved via the international-norms pathway are likely to be the most durable. However, the influence of this pathway is, perhaps, the most difficult to capture empirically. The effect of the campaign's concerted effort to frame the issue of boreal conservation in terms of existing domestic and international conservation norms cannot be untangled from any policy successes achieved via the other pathways. Though direct linkages cannot be drawn between the campaign's efforts to influence and utilise norms and subsequent policy outcomes, it is plausible that these efforts played a critical role in setting the Canadian political agenda.

The first three pathways of internationalisation have been used to various degrees to influence policy outcomes in Canada, but direct policy outcomes cannot be demonstrated empirically. In contrast, new land protections can be directly traced back to the campaign's influence via the direct-access pathway. In this pathway, Bernstein and Cashore hypothesise that transnational actors can alter the balance of power among domestic interests by contributing monetary assistance or technical expertise.

In the case of the IBCC, transnational actors, primarily from the United States, integrated themselves into the domestic policy-making process through two main avenues: 1) through assistance to and creation of Canadian ENGOs and 2) by forging partnerships with Canadian First Nation groups, who have proved critical allies to the campaign and have benefited immensely from the funding and expertise contributed by US groups (IBCC 2007). Enabled by funds, information, and legal assistance from Pew, the First Nations, and Canadian ENGOs have achieved conservation commitments that likely would not have been realised otherwise. The next subsections describe how this pathway operated and the nature of its effects in the boreal case.

[3] Personal Communication with Marilyn Heiman, Director of the Boreal Songbird Initiative, 2007

[4] Personal Communication with Larry Innes, Executive Director of the Canadian Boreal Initiative, 2008.

[5] Personal Communication with John Pierre Martel, Vice President of Sustainability for the Forest Products Association of Canada, 2008.

[6] Personal Communication with Anne Levesque, National Executive Director of Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, 2008.

9.5.1 Direct access – influencing pace and scale of policy change

Pew funding helped many domestic ENGOs in Canada build capacity, particularly for furthering conservation in the boreal forest. Pew, as the primary transnational actor in the IBCC, utilised the direct-access pathway by contributing funds, staff, and other expertise and support to Canadian ENGOs (Steven Kallick[7]). Pew started to move funds to Canadian ENGOs in 1999, primarily to aid Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS) with smaller conservation and land-use planning initiatives. The flow of assistance from Pew to Canada was supplemented by the support of groups such as Ducks Unlimited Canada and WWF Canada (Gary Stewart[8]).

In more than one case, enhanced capacity from Pew helped groups achieve protection that they had failed to achieve on their own. For example, CPAWS had been lobbying for the expansion of Nahani National Park since the 1970s, but it wasn't until 2008 that the extension was enacted. Resources from Pew may have given CPAWS the extra push it needed to convince government to expand Nahani (Stephen Woodly[9]). The relationships, funds, and other assistance brought by Pew allowed them to intensify their efforts, thereby achieving conservation goals that had remained elusive for decades.

Strategists at Pew also conceived of and started the Canadian Boreal Initiative (CBI), originally the Canadian Boreal Trust, to be the campaign's primary powerhouse within Canada's borders (Stewart Elgie[10]). The CBI was the hub of the IBCC in Canada and coordinated coalition members within Canada to work towards common conservation goals. Policy-makers were increasingly willing to work with the CBI because of the group's past successes in brokering solutions amenable to industry, aboriginal groups, Canadian ENGOs, and increasingly, the Canadian electorate. If the CBI continues to build legitimacy, the probability for realising future protection in Canada's northern forest appears to be high. By creating a single entity to concentrate on boreal protection in Canada, Pew facilitated strategic partnerships among different stakeholders in Canada.

These partnerships, new relationships, and unified objectives have not only influenced agenda-setting but have given political leaders the ability to satisfy more stakeholders at once by establishing timely and expansive conservation plans in the north. By delineating a long-term management proposal and consolidating support among scientists, businesses, First Nations, and ENGOs before the Canadian government put boreal conservation on the political agenda, the campaign took an approach that was deliberately a step ahead. The campaign also organized a letter of support for the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework that was signed by 1500 scientists, adding legitimacy to the campaign's eventual goals. Steven Kallick concluded that without the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework, it would have taken an additional three years of negotiating and lobbying; instead, the early articulation of the long-term policy goals for the boreal forced the government to deal with the campaign's pre-existing solutions (Steven Kallick[11]).

The CBI has also been successful at working with several First Nations communities to achieve mutual conservation goals in the boreal forest. Of the IBCC member groups, the CBI has forged the most partnerships with First Nations and now works with almost 20 communities and organisations. The indigenous, First Nations communities of Canada are emerging as powerful stakeholders with unique jurisdiction over the use of their traditional lands (Larry Innes[12]). The partnerships between First Nations communities and the CBI have resulted in the achievement of mutual goals that neither could have achieved alone, specifically through the creation of traditional land-use plans that incorporate conservation. New coalitions and alliances between First Nations and CBI follow a pattern of institutional change in Canada (Barry 2012), but in this case, the substantial and sustained inputs from the CBI can be seen as accelerating this change.

Encroaching development and polluted lands compromise the ability of First Nations to perpetuate their traditional land-use activities, leading First Nations to challenge government's and industry's activities as well as propose comprehensive land-use plans for their traditional territories. When ab-

[7] Personal Communication with Steven Kallick, Director of the International Boreal Conservation Campaign, Pew Charitable Trusts, 2007.

[8] Personal Communication with Gary Stewart, Senior Advisor to the International Boreal Conservation Campaign, 2008.

[9] Personal communication with Stephen Woodly, Chief Ecosystem Scientist for Parks Canada, 2008.

[10] Personal communication with Stewart Elgie, Faculty of Law University of Ottawa and first Director of the Canadian Boreal Initiative, 2008.

[11] Personal communication with Steven Kallick, Director of the International Boreal Conservation Campaign, Pew Charitable Trusts, 2007.

[12] Personal Commination with Larry Innes, Executive Director of the Canadian Boreal Initiative, 2008.

original chiefs signed treaties with the Europeans in Canada, they did not surrender the land but rather were granted rights to ensure the peace between the natives and settlers. The Canadian constitution delineates that aboriginal people in Canada are recognised and affirmed as having aboriginal treaty rights, which include the rights of indigenous peoples to sustain their cultural practices on the land, such as hunting, fishing, trapping, and other cultural activities. These land-use claims and related legal statutes have given First Nations the unique ability to halt development and secure protections on Crown lands (including the Canadian boreal forest) (JP Gladeau[13]).

Many First Nations, however, lack the capacity to take advantage of their treaty rights and have been denied access to the policy process. Pew, primarily through the CBI, contributed monetary resources to First Nation communities to increase their capacity locally.[14] The IBCC and its constituent organisations offered legal counsel and support, funds, and other technical information such as maps and ecological analysis to First Nation groups trying to secure lands for traditional use or to block industrial activity that compromises their land-use rights (Susan Casey-Lefkowitz[15]). First Nations communities became the human face of boreal conservation, and partnerships between IBCC member groups and First Nation communities have engendered many of the new protections in the boreal forest.

9.5.2 Assessing direct access into domestic forest policy

It is important to reassess Bernstein and Cashore's hypotheses for the direct-access pathway to ascertain whether they fit with the evidence presented. The hypotheses predict that the success of influence along this pathway is predicated on the openness of the policy subsystem to outside actors. While many Canadian ENGOs were open to joining coalitions, First Nations communities have been more hesitant to work with environmental groups to create parks or protected areas since parks, in the past, have been designed in ways that kept First Nations groups off of their traditional lands (JP Gladeau[16]). First Nations groups, however, are amenable to development on their lands as long as they can also preserve their traditional ways of life: indeed, most First Nations engage in multiple forms of collaborative relationships with both timber companies and other groups (Wyatt et al. 2013). The Pew campaign has successfully partnered with multiple First Nations groups by effectively demonstrating how protected areas can meet the needs of the community (JP Gladeau[17]). This is an example of an external ENGO aligning its conservation mandate with social, economic, and cultural goals of the First Nation community, creating a powerful policy coalition (Bennett and Lemelin 2013).

If policy networks are accessible, Bernstein and Cashore predict that the degree to which policies can be influenced will depend on the state's autonomy from traditional business interests. Environmental initiatives are largely favoured by members of both parties. Because of increased global attention to climate change, the environment has become a split issue that could potentially determine a Canadian election. Thus, Canadian politicians tend to seek environmentally beneficial accomplishments, and because no one is sure how to adequately or cost-effectively address climate change, it is much easier and less expensive to protect land (Jeremy Wilson[18]).

Bernstein and Cashore also predict that the success of new domestic organisations depends on the ability of those organisations to be involved in highly technical policy networks (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). The directors of the CBI have forged important relationships with government decision-makers and other high-level stakeholder groups within Canada. The CBI is set up to work with businesses (through the Boreal Leadership Council), First Nations in Canada, and governments and to be the broker of solutions when these interests come together to negotiate. For example, CBI provided consultation to Ontario's provincial decision-makers in a heated dispute between the Kitchenuhmaykoosib

[13] Personal communication with JP Gladeau, Senior Aboriginal Advisor for the CBI and Director of the Aboriginal Strategy Group, 2008.

[14] For analysis of similar cases in Canada and Finland through the lens of institutional capacity, see, respectively, Berry 2012 and Saarikoski et al. 2011, 2013.

[15] Personal Communication with Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, Senior Attourney at the Natural Resources Defense Council, 2008.

[16] Personal communication with JP Gladeau, Senior Aboriginal Advisor for the CBI and Director of the Aboriginal Strategy Group, 2008.

[17] Personal communication with JP Gladeau, Senior Aboriginal Advisor for the CBI and Director of the Aboriginal Strategy Group, 2008.

[18] Personal communication with Jermey Wilson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria, 2008.

Inninuwug (KI) First Nations and a Toronto mining exploration company over unsustainable mining practices. The resolution of the conflict came when Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty announced a complete overhaul of the outdated mining practices in Ontario and, in the spirit (and language) of the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework, established a commitment to protect 50% of Ontario's boreal forest from resource extraction. Campaign leaders agree that the CBI's involvement was instrumental in achieving this outcome (Stewart Elgie[19], Larry Innes[20]). In the absence of the CBI, it is likely that some degree of mining reform and reparations would have followed the dispute, but the involvement of the CBI in negotiations between the KI and the government of Ontario undoubtedly led to the adoption of a much more comprehensive resource management policy: the adoption of the Boreal Forest Conservation Framework.

The direct-access pathway appears to be the strategy that has had the most success at achieving protected areas on the ground (Scher 2008). Though the convergence of pressures from many pathways, including pre-existing domestic pressures, cannot be discounted, campaign directors agree that the IBCC's engagement with Canadian First Nations was the biggest boon to the campaign (Steven Kallick[21], JP Gladeau[22], Larry Innes[23]). This is notable given their absence from the CBFA process. With the aid of additional knowledge and financial resources from the campaign, the First Nations groups that have partnered with the CBI have possessed the political will and legal authority to conserve lands through local and national policy processes.

The main impact of this direct-access influence was not in direction but in the pace and scale of conservation (Scher 2008). Though Canadian ENGOs were moving policy in the direction of boreal forest protection and many First Nations would have eventually exercised their land-use rights, the legal and technical assistance from Pew allowed them to establish these plans more quickly and justify claims to larger land areas. Furthermore, the campaign was able to demonstrate the importance of conservation for these communities, likely resulting in more land dedicated to non-extractive uses in the final land-use agreements.

Following significant and sustained activity on the part of a transnational coalition associated with the IBCC, Canadian provincial and territorial governments enacted the cumulative protection of roughly 129 million ha[24] of new wilderness in the Canadian boreal forest (IBCC 2008). Between 1999 and 2005 (five years before the CBA), 26.5 million ha were strictly protected and 12 million more ha were under interim or imminent protection (IBCC 2007, 2008). In November of 2007, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the protection of 10.3 million ha in Canada's Northwest Territories. In July 2008, Premier Dalton McGuinty of Ontario pledged to protect half of Ontario's northern boreal forest from resource extraction, an area amounting to roughly 26 million ha of land and larger than the land area of Great Britain (The Gazette, Montreal 2008). Following on the heels of the McGuinty announcement, Quebec's Premier Jean Charest also announced that half of Quebec's northern forest would be protected from development and resource extraction, pushing the aggregate total area of protection to roughly 129 million ha (IBCC 2008). These protection decisions in Ontario and Quebec mark two of the largest conservation actions in the history of North America (Bernstein et al. 2010). Each of these incremental changes occurred before the CBFA and, in many cases, without the support of companies targeted by market campaigns (see Map "Boreal Forest Conservation Accomplishments since 2000" in Supporting Maps and Graphics for Carlson et al. 2009[25]).

With these new additions, permanent and interim protection since the inception of the campaign amounts to more than 22% of the boreal ecosystem. Prior to the campaign, roughly 8% of Canada's boreal forest was protected, resulting in an aggregate

[19] Personal communication with Stewart Elgie, Faculty of Law University of Ottawa and first Director of the Canadian Boreal Initiative, 2008.

[20] Personal communication with Larry Innes, Executive Director of the Canadian Boreal Initiative, 2008.

[21] Personal Communication with Steven Kallick, Director of the International Boreal Conservation Campaign, Pew Charitable Trusts, 2007.

[22] Personal communication with JP Gladeau, Senior Aboriginal Advisor for the CBI and Director of the Aboriginal Strategy Group, 2008.

[23] Personal communication with Larry Innes, Executive Director of the Canadian Boreal Initiative, 2008.

[24] This figure includes permanent protection, interim protection, and commitments that were still in the process of being translated to land-use plans at the time the figure was calculated. Campaign history suggests that backsliding is not a problem and that interim protections will be finalised.

[25] Map "Boreal Forest Conservation Accomplishments since 2000" Accessible at http://www.borealbirds.org/images/carbon/map-canprotected.png.

protection of 30% of the entire ecosystem prior to the CBA. Other new protection not specified here is primarily in the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, Quebec, and Labrador (IBCC 2008). Considering the substantial effects of the IBCC through the direct-access pathway prior to the CBFA, the CBFA itself is not the primary locus of policy punctuation but rather a moment at which changes that had long been in the works were recognised as a significant punctuation.

9.5.3 Implications for NGOs and business strategies and further research

Additional research is needed to refine how and when the direct-access pathway is likely to affect the pace and scale of domestic policy. Further research is also needed to assess interaction among pathways. As the case of the CBI and market campaigns leading to the CBFA illustrates, direct-access and market pathways interact and, in addition to being aware of the distinct logics and conditions described in this chapter, NGOs may want to sequence campaigns. Companies, aware of the effects that transnational actors can have on policy may want to manage their practices and brands accordingly, perhaps even aligning with transnational actors and their local partners to boost brands and expand markets for sustainable forest products.

Though certification is a popular demand of boycott campaigns, it, like the boycott itself, lacks durability unless fully embraced and integrated into a company's business model. Rather than advocating for certification or changed practices directly, NGOs might ask that companies lend their support to regulations – for example, ones that require certification practices as called for by the CBFA. This translates market power into durable policy change. For targeted companies that are primarily interested in differentiating themselves through certification anyway, advocating for policy changes might be an added cost that potentially dilutes brand differentiation. However, where the primary interest is ending a damaging boycott campaign, this strategy may work well because it imposes similar cost on competitors and because durable policy agreements create more predictable business environment than fickle industry-NGO agreements. The ability of an agreement like the CBFA to inoculate companies like those in the Canadian Forest Products Association from future market campaigns rests on the agreement becoming legitimate policy and then demonstrating compliance with that policy.

The boreal case shows that sequencing of pathways travelled by campaigns may be counterintuitive. While the high-profile agreement was announced as a settlement after the boycott campaigns had peaked, the groundwork laying the foundations for the process began many years prior to the market campaigns. An existing process with legitimacy among policy-makers and industry provides a place for boycott campaigns to translate power from the market to policy. It should be noted that while targeting modest, practical, achievable policy solutions, such a process must maintain strong environmental credentials in order to ensure that environmentalist brands are not damaged and that industry brands are bolstered. For industry, this approach, again, may be desirable because it focuses on broad policy solutions that spread regulatory costs across the industry and make these costs predictable. However, engaging in a process with lofty environmental goals may increase expectations for environmental performance. Depending on the process framework, industry representatives may have a veto on recommendations.

As seen in the boreal case, building capacity among local groups though funding, technical and legal assistance, and training can shift the balance of power among stakeholders at local and national scales, causing incremental policy changes that can add up to significant change, possibly more significant than more higher-profile strategies. However, more research is needed to identify potential strategies and causal logics that might connect local capacity-building to national-level balances of power and market dynamics. Further research might also explore the conditions under which powerful forestry companies might support such direct-access policy advocacy.

9.6 Conclusions: Internationalisation of domestic forest policy?

Actors empowered by the IBCC continue to be a force in Canadian domestic policy, and policy debates about relative levels of protection and harvesting in Canada's boreal forest are ongoing. On December 6, 2012, Greenpeace announced its withdrawal from the CBFA, citing road-building that it claimed violated the agreement and that the "only responsible decision for Greenpeace [was] to pursue other pathways to obtain results in the forest" (McDiarmid 2012). For those who saw the effect of the IBCC as emerging from market pressure that forced forest products companies to agree to the CBFA, this development may seem to question the durability of the results of such campaigns. However, a closer look at the multiple pathways travelled shows that the conditions required for market pressure to be effective are inconsistent with many of the observed policy

changes. Rather, the effect of the IBCC can be seen in multiple policy venues with substantial effects preceding and beyond the CBFA itself, primarily through forming partnerships and sharing resources with domestic groups.

This chapter has shown not only the importance of this direct-access pathway but also how more empirical and theoretical work is needed regarding the operation of this pathway and the interaction among initiatives. These conclusions are based upon evidence from the past 20 years with respect to two types of policy change: forestland designations (e.g. protected areas) and forest management practice requirements. Our units of analysis for process tracing included both governmental processes (provincial and federal) and private governance (forest certification and industry/NGO agreements) because each of these processes, state and non-state, was able to affect these land designations and forest practices. Applying Bernstein and Cashore's framework revealed two things: 1) Despite the emphasis placed on the markets pathway in the existing literature, the direct access pathway has been much more important than previously thought and 2) building upon Cashore and Howlett's critique of the "external perturbations" model, we can improve upon our understanding of the mechanisms of change, the pace and scale of policy change, and hence the resulting policy equilibrium.

Just as environmental problems often reach beyond sovereign borders, the effects of internationalisation cannot be neatly boxed off from pre-existing domestic forces at work. Indeed, in the case of the IBCC, our evidence suggests that transnational actors were not responsible for altering the directionality of boreal conservation. Nevertheless, transnational actors do appear to have amplified conservation in Canada's boreal forest. They increased the pace and scale of policy change, both by adding resources to domestic efforts and raising the issue on the national agenda. International pressures do matter, but just how they do (i.e. the precise nature of their causal influences) and their interactions with domestic processes are critically important questions in this era where prominent issues of domestic environmental management are global as well as local.

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